Pivotal Politics by Keith Krehbiel download in iPad, ePub, pdf
Parties are not a party of the model, and the status quo is assumed to be exognously given. But after this brief burst of activity, the president will find a decreasing number of policies that can actually be changed given the current alignment of preferences. Similarly, if the status quo is at M, then M refuses to change things.
He argues that divided government does not explain why and when gridlock will occur i. Finally, if the status quo is at V, then V refuses to override any vetoes.
On its face, the premise is hard to disagree with. The chief advantage of his argument is parsimony. Moreover, those changes that are made will tend to be incremental. Assuming the president is to the right of Congress, then you have preferences ordered as F - M - V - P. Furthermore, the game is not repeated formally.
Next, the president decides whether to veto. In some circumstances, perhaps they don't. As you can guess from my rating, I don't exactly agree with Krehbiel that all those other things don't matter.
For any status quo to the right of this point, M is the outcome. Median voter theorem Black Krehbiel's argument is similar, but looks at why it isn't always the median voter that wins.
And there is no discussion of agenda setting, except the vague notion that the status quo policies furthest from the new composition are the most likely to be changed. Elections matter, as some have phrased it.
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